Unknowns, Systemic Risks and Risk Prioritization in Schedule Risk Analysis

Presented to APM

Value of Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) Conference

London February 2016

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Secretary Rumsfeld's use of "Unknown Unknowns"

In February 2002 DOD Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stated:

"Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because as we know:

> There are known knowns; there are things we know we know.
>
> We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know.
>
> But there are also unknown unknowns -- the ones we don't know we don't know.

And if one looks throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tend to be the difficult ones."

(source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/There_are_known_knowns cited January 26, 2015)

Uncertainty including Inherent Variability, Estimating Error, Estimating Bias

- Inherent variability in project activities that arise because people and organizations cannot do things reliably on plan
- Estimating error – attaches to all types of estimates
- Estimating bias – estimates may be slanted, usually toward shorter durations, to make desired project results

"There are No Facts About the Future"

Lincoln Moses, Statistician and Administrator of Energy Information in the US DOE 1977 Annual Report to Congress)

Uncertainty

- Uncertainty in schedule duration is similar to "common cause" variation related to six sigma management, concepts developed by Walter Shewhart and championed by Edwards Demming
- "Common cause variability is a source of variation caused by unknown factors that result in a steady but random distribution of output around the average of the data …. Common cause variation is also called random variation, noise, non-controllable variation … " (http://www.isixsigma.com/dictionary/common-cause-variation/)
- Hence application of uncertainty alone establishes the earliest date that risk mitigation can achieve even if individual risks were fully mitigated

Example Schedule: Offshore Gas Production Platform Project

Case Study On Application of Uncertainty and Risk

UID	Task	Start Date	End Date	Duration	Cost
Gas Platform	▼ Offshore Gas Production Platfor	01/01/2016	04/04/2019	1,190	$1.717M
Gas Platform	▼ Milestones and Hammocks	01/01/2016	04/04/2019	1,190	$400,000
A1000	Project Start	01/01/2016		0	$0
A1010	Project Sanction		07/18/2016	0	$0
A1020	First Gas		04/04/2019	0	$0
A1030	Project Management Ham	01/01/2016	04/04/2019	1,190	$400,000
Gas Platform	▼ Decision Making	04/10/2016	07/18/2016	100	$8,000
B1000	Approval Process	04/10/2016	07/18/2016	100	$8,000
Gas Platform	▼ Engineering	01/01/2016	11/30/2017	700	$256,000
C950	FEED	07/19/2016	02/03/2017	200	$80,000
C1010	Detailed Engineering	02/04/2017	11/30/2017	300	$160,000
C900	Concept Engineering	01/01/2016	04/09/2016	100	$16,000
Gas Platform	▼ Procurement	02/04/2017	09/06/2018	580	$350,000
D1000	Procurement of LLE	02/04/2017	09/06/2018	580	$250,000
D1010	Procurement of Other Equ	12/01/2017	08/07/2018	250	$100,000
Gas Platform	▼ Fabrication	12/01/2017	11/05/2018	340	$536,000
E1000	Fabricate Drilling Topsides	12/01/2017	06/18/2018	200	$80,000
E1010	Fabricate Drilling Jacket	12/01/2017	06/18/2018	200	$80,000
E1020	Fabricate CPP Topsides	12/01/2017	09/26/2018	300	$240,000
E1030	Fabricate CPP Jacket	12/01/2017	08/07/2018	250	$104,000
E1025	Install LLE Equipment	09/27/2018	11/05/2018	40	$32,000
Gas Platform	▼ Drilling	08/03/2018	11/10/2018	100	$80,000
F1000	Drilling for First Gas Only	08/03/2018	11/10/2018	100	$80,000
Gas Platform	▼ Installation	06/19/2018	12/05/2018	170	$47,200
G1000	Install Drilling Platform Ja	06/19/2018	07/08/2018	20	$8,000
G1010	Install Drilling Topsides	07/09/2018	08/02/2018	25	$13,600
G1020	Install CPP Jacket	08/08/2018	08/27/2018	20	$9,600
G1030	Install CPP Topsides	11/06/2018	12/05/2018	30	$16,000
Gas Platform	▼ HUC	12/06/2018	04/04/2019	120	$40,000
H1000	Hook UP and Commission	12/06/2018	04/04/2019	120	$40,000



Offshore Gas Production Platform Construction project, 3+ years and $1.7 billion.
Using Polaris© from Booz Allen Hamilton

Correcting for Inherent Variability, Estimating Error and Bias

- Schedule uncertainty exhibiting inherent variation, estimating uncertainty and bias with ranges of .9, 1.05 and 1.3
- To replicate the estimated overall project ranges by using these parameters for individual activities we need to correlate the uncertainty



Variation Caused by Known Unknowns

- Project-specific risks are:
  - Characterized by probability of occurring that is usually less than 100%
  - Represent “root causes” of variation in durations
  - May be reducible by risk mitigation actions
- These are specified during risk interviews and implemented with:
  - Estimated probabilities
  - Impact ranges (3-point estimates of multiplicative factors called Risk Drivers”) if they occur
  - The activities or cost elements they influence

Project-Specific Risks, Pre-Mitigated

- Risk is similar to "special causes" in six sigma
- "… special cause variation is caused by known factors that result in a non-random distribution of output…Special cause variation is a shift in output caused by a specific factor such as environmental conditions or process input parameters. It can be accounted for directly and potentially removed…" (http://www.isixsigma.com/dictionary/variation-special-cause/)
- Hence, pre-mitigated risks are the subject of risk mitigation workshops. The improvement from risk mitigation is limited by the date determined by uncertainty alone

Applying Known Unknowns: Project-Specific Risk Drivers to the Offshore Platform

Risk Driver Editor

Risk Drivers Add

Enabled ☑	UID	Risk Driver Name	Description	Probal
☑	1	Bids may be Abusive leading to delayed approval		60%
☑	2	Engineering may be complicated by using offshore design firm		40%
☑	3	Suppliers of installed equipment may be busy		30%
☑	4	Fabrication yards may experience lower Productivity than planned		55%
☑	5	The subsea geological conditions may be different than expected		45%
☑	6	Installation may be delayed due to coordination problems		55%
☑	7	Fabrication and installation problems may be revealed during HUC		40%
☑	8	The organization has other priority projects so personnel and funding may be unavailable		35%
☐	9	Megaproject may have interdependency problems		20%
☐	10	Megaproject may have coordination problems offshore sourcing		10%
☐	11	Megaproject may have excessive schedule pressure		15%

Risk Driver Impact Editor

Tasks Add Remove

Task	Parallel ☐
B1000 - Approval Process	☐
C1010 - Detailed Engineering	☐
D1000 - Procurement of LLE	☐
D1010 - Procurement of Other Equipment	☐
E1000 - Fabricate Drilling Topsides	☐
E1010 - Fabricate Drilling Jacket	☐
E1020 - Fabricate CPP Topsides	☐
E1030 - Fabricate CPP Jacket	☐
F1000 - Drilling for First Gas Only	☐
G1000 - Install Drilling Platform Jacket	☐
G1010 - Install Drilling Topsides	☐

Duration Factor

Triangular - Min:0.95 Likely:1.05 Max:1.25

Cost Factor

None - Original value: 1

There are 8 project-specific Risk Drivers including one Organizational Risk Driver assigned to all activities. Probability and impact multiplier ranges are specified, risks are assigned to activities. A risk can affect many activities, and an activity can be affected by several risks.

Adding Project Specific Risk Drivers



Adding Project-Specific Risk Drivers increases P-80 Duration to 125% of planned

Unknown Unknowns May Not be Unknowable

- Interviews or workshops on risk often focus on risks and uncertainties that are close-in or actually happening now
  - This myopia leads to insufficient consideration of future risks
- It is arguable that <u>some unknown unknowns are not truly unknowable but just have not been thought of yet</u>
- Extra effort to focus on down-stream risks during the risk interviews could improve our understanding of risks, including making some of these "Unknown Unknowns" known

Add a Fourth Category of "Unknown Knowns"

- Psychoanalytic philosopher Slavoj Zizek says that beyond these three categories there is a fourth, the unknown known, that which we intentionally refuse to acknowledge that we know
- German sociologists Daase and Kessler (2007) agree with a basic point of Rumsfeld in stating that the cognitive frame for political practice may be determined by the relationship between *what we know, what we do not know, what we cannot know*, but Rumsfeld having left out *what we do not like to know*

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/There_are_known_knowns, Cited 12/26/2015)

Risk Interviews vs. Risk Workshops (1)

- Risk Interviews provide a safe environment to discuss both Unknown Unknowns and Unknown Knowns
- Specifically, Unknown Knowns
  - We find that **the Risk Register is always incomplete**
  - Many of the risk events found to be most important in determining the schedule risk results are not in the Risk Register at all
  - These can be safely discussed in one-on-one interviews where confidentiality is promised
- In these interviews new risks are discussed, whether they are hurtful to the project or embarrassing or not
  - Responding to open-ended questions, interviewees are encouraged to talk about "the good, the bad and the ugly"

Risk Interviews vs. Risk Workshops (2)

- We need to avoid the ostrich approach to risk management. Identify, talk about and quantify the Unknown Knowns, the "elephant in the room," and tell unbiased results
- Risk interviews provide a confidential environment where individuals can talk in depth without being afraid of being embarrassed, pressured or subjected to "shoot the messenger"
- Conversely, Risk Workshops often are places where social pressures or group dynamics limit debate
  - Groupthink – prefer unanimity, discourage dissent
  - "Moses factor" – adopting influential person's ideas
  - Cultural Conformity – decisions match the group's norms

David Hillson and Ruth Murray-Webster, Understanding and Managing Risk Attitude 2005

Considering Systemic Risks

Compare what Risk Analysis Typically Predicts vs. What Actually Happens



Source: John K. Hollmann, PE, "Reliable Risk Quantification for Project Cost and Schedule", AACE International webinar December 15, 2015

Incorporate Systemic Risks into the Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS)

- Systemic Risks that include:
  - Technical complexity, new technology challenging
  - Scope not fully known
  - Process definition not complete
  - Megaproject complexity, size / duration, participants
  - Project organization, e.g., joint venture, multiple EPCs
  - Project management, scheduling and estimating process, bias
- Some argue that these factors can be measured and their impact on project success estimated using parametric techniques

Inserting 3 Megaproject Systemic Risks with Original Uncertainty

- Identifying the systemic risks and inserting them with appropriately-large impacts allows us to:
  - Specify the probability of occurrence
  - Identify the risks for risk mitigation
- In this case study, these megaproject risks:
  - May have interdependency issues between project elements
  - May have complex offshoring of supply chain and even EPC contractors
  - May have excessive schedule pressure “I want it sooner”

Megaproject Systemic Risk Example

Discrete | Driver

Selected Risk Scenario: Baseline | Edit

Risk Driver Editor

Enabled ☑	UID	Risk Driver Name	Descrip
☑	1	Bids may be Abusive leading to delayed approval	
☑	2	Engineering may be complicated by using offshore design firm	
☑	3	Suppliers of installed equipment may be busy	
☑	4	Fabrication yards may experience lower Productivity than planned	
☑	5	The subsea geological conditions may be different than expected	
☑	6	Installation may be delayed due to coordination problems	
☑	7	Fabrication and installation problems may be revealed during HUC	
☑	8	The organization has other priority projects so personnel and funding may be unavailable	
☑	9	Megaproject may have interdependency problems	
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☑	11	Megaproject may have excessive schedule pressure	

Risk Driver Impact Editor

Tasks | Add | Remove

Task	Parallel ☐
B1000 - Approval Process	☑
C1010 - Detailed Engineering	☑
C900 - Concept Engineering	☑
C950 - FEED	☑
D1000 - Procurement of LLE	☑
D1010 - Procurement of Other Equipment	☑
E1000 - Fabricate Drilling Topsides	☑
E1010 - Fabricate Drilling Jacket	☑
E1020 - Fabricate CPP Topsides	☑
E1025 - Install LLE Equipment	☑
E1030 - Fabricate CPP Jacket	☑
F1000 - Drilling for First Gas Only	☑

Duration Factor

Triangular - Min:1.4 Likely:1.5 Max:1.7

Cost Factor

None - Original Value: 1

Individual Systemic Risks with Regular Uncertainty Approximates Hollmann



Parameters for specific Megaproject Systemic Risks are challenging, need to be selected based on historical data

We need to be sure to include the systemic risks with the right probability and impact ranges based on data into the Monte Carlo simulation

Results for Total Project Duration from MCS



Some suggest that megaprojects that come in at 25% or less (cost) over the sanction budget are considered successful. This curve shows that about 50% do so.

The P-80 duration is 1,913 days about 61% overrun of schedule

Results are Similar to those for Cost Provided by IPA



Figure 8 - Cost Deviation Results for FEL 2 Estimates Compared to Actual Costs

"Quantifying Estimate Accuracy and Precision for the Process Industries: A Review of Industry Data" Alexander Ogilvie, Robert A. Brown, Jr., Fredrick P. Biery and Paul Barshop from IPA. IPA's Front End Loading (FEL) 2 is "Scoping Facility Planning," comparable to AACE International Class 4 estimates which gets a high range of +30% to +50%. <u>This is not high enough</u>

Risk Prioritization Method Illustrated

Problems with Typical Risk Prioritization Approaches

- Risk prioritization usually involves presenting:
  - Standard tornado diagrams based on correlation between activities and finish date
  - Risk tornado diagrams, based on correlation between risks and finish date
    - Correlation-based tornados have problems with risks that may or may not occur
  - Risk criticality based on activities' being on the critical path
- None of these methods give management what they need to assess mitigations
  - Risks prioritized at the P-80, not means as in correlation
  - Risks measured in days saved if mitigated, not correlation coefficients
  - Risks have to be the arguments driving MCS to do this

Prioritizing Risks using MCS Selected by their Days Saved at P-80

Iterative Approach to Prioritizing Risks (Based on Days Saved at P-80)								
Risk #	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Priority Level (Iteration #)	Abusive Bids	Offshore design firm	Suppliers Busy	Fab productivity	Geology unknown	Coordination during Installation	Problems at HUC	Resources may go to other projects
1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	**1**
2	X	X	X	**2**	X	X	X	
3	X	**3**	X		X	X	X	
4	X		X		X	X	**4**	
5	X		**5**		X	X		
6	X				X	**6**		
7	**7**				X			
8					**8**			

Risk Prioritization for Mitigation



Risk Prioritization Results for Risk Mitigation Workshop

Risk Prioritization at P-80 with Days Saved	
Name	Days Saved
Megaproject may have interdependency problems	245
Megaproject may have excessive schedule pressure	128
The organization has other priority projects so personnel and funding may be unavailable	54
Megaproject may have coordination problems offshore sourcing	46
Fabrication yards may experience lower Productivity than planned	25
Engineering may be complicated by using offshore design firm	12
Suppliers of installed equipment may be busy	13
Fabrication and installation problems may be revealed during HUC	9
Bids may be Abusive leading to delayed approval	1
Installation may be delayed due to coordination problems	1
The subsea geological conditions may be different than expected	0
Days Saved from Project Specific and Systemic Risks	534
Days Contributed by Uncertainty alone	189
Total Days contingency at P-80	723

Risk Mitigation Workshop(s)

- This is a workshop with the project manager, deputy PM, team leads, controls personnel, SMEs with experience
- A mitigation action must be:
  - Different from what is being done now, or you get what you have now
  - Committed to by the organization
  - Budgeted, staffed, scheduled, owned
  - Monitored frequently, willing to admit when it is not working
- Do not get to take credit for mitigation actions that are not committments

Sample Risk Mitigation Entry

Risk: The organization has other priority projects so personnel and funding may be unavailable							
		Probability	Low	Most Likely	High	P-80 Date	P-80 Cost ($ billions)
	Pre-Mitigated parameters	65%	95%	105%	125%	1/22/2018	$2.13
Mitigation Action	Establish this project as top priority - needs top management action and commitment						
	Post -Mitigated parameters	**15%**	**95%**	**100%**	**115%**	**10/20/2017**	**$1.99**
Risk Owner:	S. Smith					Days saved	Cost Saved
Date of Action:	Within 1 month				Results	94	$0.14
Risk Action Owner:	B. Blake				Cost of Mitigation		$0.02

Risk is not completely mitigated. Cost saved is the reduction of cost contingency reserve held for schedule risk. For Net Cost Saved subtract the $20 million cost of mitigation

Creating the Post-Mitigated Scenario

- A risk post-mitigated scenario can be constructed in the software
  - Partially mitigate each risk, in this case just by reducing probability by half
  - Estimate the cost of the risk, in this case each risk's mitigation = $50 million
  - Run the post mitigated scenario
- When schedule risks are mitigated the cost contingency reserve can be reduced since some was held for schedule growth
- However, the cost of the project now includes the assumed $50 million cost of each mitigation

Partially Mitigate all Risks – Finish Date



Mitigating all risks (Here, just reducing the probability by half) moves the P-80 date by total mitigation time of about 7.5 months.

Partially Mitigate all Risks – Total Cost



Notice the effect of the mitigation costs – in the red circle – these are included and still there is some cost savings, largely from the schedule risk mitigation

Summary (1)

- Unknown Unknowns are unknown today, but some may become known during confidential interviews
- A new category of "Unknown Knowns," or those risks which are known to exist but are not talked about, is addressed

Summary (2)

- Confidential interviews allow interviewees to identify "unknown unknowns" and to discuss "unknown knowns"
- Interviewees introduce risks not included in the current Risk Register
  - Open ended questions often reveal important, embarrassing or potentially dangerous risks that are not talked about
  - Once introduced, other team members seem to be able to contribute to quantifying those "unspoken risks"
  - These "interview risks" are often more impactful than the risks in the Risk Register

Summary (3)

- Monte Carlo simulation methods have been challenged to address systemic risks
  - Some say that systemic risks are best captured by parametric analysis
- We show how systemic risks, often identified with megaprojects, can be handled in MCS, compared to simple expanding the uncertainty ranges
- Project results databases need to be created or mined if they exist to determine the impact multipliers for systemic risks.

Summary (4)

- Risk mitigation decisions are greatly helped with prioritized risks
- Risks need to be prioritized at the target level of certainty, e.g., P-80
- Risks prioritization needs to supply some metric that management can use in a benefit / cost analysis, e.g., “days saved” even if assuming perfect mitigation
- These tables have been useful in mitigation workshops

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